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Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment Agreements, Copyrighted 
or Patented Products and the First Sale Doctrine 
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Agency 
 
Throughout the history of resale price maintenance manufacturers have used a 
variety of devices to control the prices that intermediaries handling their products 
charged downstream customers.1 Among these are the manufacturer's designating 
those handling its product as “agents” and authorizing them to convey its title in the 
goods directly to consumers2
Let us put patented and copyrighted goods aside for the moment and begin with 
“ordinary” products, where the contract between the manufacturer and an intermediary 
designates the latter as the former's “agent,” who promises to sell the manufacturer-
owned goods for no less than a specified price. The reasonableness and legality of a 
contract so limiting the agent's pricing freedom is not automatically answered by the Dr. 
Miles rule governing contracts with “independent” businesspersons. After all, 
 or, in the case of patented or copyrighted products, to 
“license” consumers to use the product for a “royalty” that the manufacturer specifies. 
Patent and copyright holders have also attempted to specify prices in a manner that 
purported to make transactions at lower prices infringements of the patent or copyright. 
Such efforts have been largely unsuccessful. 
                                                 
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 
1See also 8 Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶1622-1627 (3d ed. 2010). 
 
2Although the next downstream party need not be the ultimate consumer, it simplifies exposition to 
speak of “consumers” rather than to use more general or abstract descriptions. 
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employment contracts requiring employees to charge only those prices specified by 
their employer are lawful, notwithstanding their restraint of employees' freedom. That 
result is usually phrased in terms not of the reasonableness of the restraint but of the 
absence of any cognizable conspiracy.3
In sum, given that resale price maintenance is assessed under §1 of the Sherman 
Act, the legal issue can be phrased as one of the agent's capacity to conspire with its 
principal over prices to consumers. In all events, the existence of a cognizable 
conspiracy between principal and agent or its reasonableness depends upon policy 
judgments about whether and in what circumstances agents should be regarded as part 
of a principal's enterprise and thus as subject to internal direction about downstream 
pricing without regard to the Dr. Miles rule. 
 The employee is regarded as “inside the firm,” 
and thus the manager's and employee's “agreement” that the latter will charge a certain 
price is regarded as a unilateral act. 
The law on this question seemed settled in 1926 when the Supreme Court held in 
General Electric that a manufacturer could lawfully fix the prices charged by its 
“agents.”4 That doctrine, however, was severely limited in 1964 by Simpson,5
                                                 
3See 7 Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶1471-1472 (3d ed. 2010) (in press), 
which explore the issue in detail and consider possible exceptions to the text statement.  See, e.g., 
Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 561 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2009) (post-Leegin RPM decision; 
agency agreement did not create Sherman Act conspiracy). 
 which 
invoked the Dr. Miles condemnation notwithstanding the manufacturer's agency 
4United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The Court was careful to point out that a 
patentee who manufactures the product protected by the patent and fails to retain its ownership in it 
cannot control the price at which it is resold. Id. at 489. 
 
5Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).  See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Dr. Miles’ Orphans: 
Vertical Conspiracy and Consignment in the Wake of Leegin (Working Paper, Feb. 20, 2010, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1556491). 
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arrangements with a “vast” number of intermediaries whom the Court deemed to be 
“independent businessmen.”  
 
RPM and the First Sale Doctrine 
 When patented or copyrighted articles were made the subject of resale price 
maintenance agreements, manufacturers sometimes labeled the product with notices 
that stated that the dealers who bought them were “licensed” to resell only at specified 
prices. The manufacturers sued those who sold for less as infringers. Rather than 
obtaining or enforcing any contractual promise by dealers, as in Dr. Miles, 
manufacturers claimed that such notices defined the extent of the license they granted 
purchasers to use their patents or copyrights and that reselling for a lower price 
departed from that license and thus infringed the patent or copyright.5.1
Such claims have been read very narrowly by the Supreme Court. In its 1908 
Bobbs-Merrill decision, the Court held that a retailer who had sold a book for less than 
the specified price did not infringe the publisher's copyright, notwithstanding the 
publisher's notice declaring such a sale to be an infringement.
 
6
                                                 
5.1 For fuller exploration of these issues, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and 
Competitive Harm, ___ NYU Annual Survey of American Law ___ (2010) (in press), available at 
 Although the copyright 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540527 (Feb., 2010). 
 
6Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). This decision, as well as others dealing with resale 
price maintenance where patents, copyrights, or other intellectual property are involved, are explored in 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, & Christopher R. Leslie, IP and Antitrust: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law §§24.1c, 24.2d (2d ed. 2010). On 
copyright, the rationale of the first sale limitation is qualified if the underlying product is licensed rather 
than sold, and the license in question is worded and displayed in such a fashion that the purchaser can be 
said to have assented to it. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (shrinkwrap 
license enforceable if purchaser/licensee of software had chance to read it before opening software 
package); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, 846 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
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statute precluded others from publishing the book, it did not limit subsequent disposition 
of books published and sold by the copyright holder. To add to the publisher's “right of 
exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales 
must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the 
statute.”7
The Court did not then rule upon the enforceability of a contractual promise to 
charge a specified price, although it later did so in Dr. Miles. To be sure, patented or 
copyrighted articles might be distinguished from ordinary goods, but the Supreme Court 
has ruled since 1873 that patented articles pass outside the statutory monopoly once 
sold, and there are no grounds for giving greater power to copyright holders. In Adams, 
before the Sherman Act was passed, the plaintiff had rights under a patent to 
manufacture certain coffin lids within ten miles of Boston.
 
8
[I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the 
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole 
value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he 
 He sold lids to the defendant 
undertaker, who used some of them outside the ten-mile limit. The Court found no 
infringement: 
                                                                                                                                                             
(“first sale” doctrine did not apply when Microsoft licensed software to a third party who re-licensed to 
plaintiff); Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 2000 WL 1683386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000), aff'd, 793 A.2d 1048 
(Conn. 2002) (purchaser or computer from third party implicitly accepted license to Microsoft Windows 
that was bundled with the machine). Other decisions continue to follow its rationale. E.g., Klocek v. 
Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (purchaser not bound by terms of shrinkwrap license; 
discussing the split in decisions). See 1 7 U.S.C. §109. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of 
Contract,  67 Md. L. Rev. 616 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of 
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1999). 
7Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351. 
 
8Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
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parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in the language 
of the court, passes without the limit of the [statutory patent] 
monopoly. That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in the 
act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims 
for use of the invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is 
open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on 
account of the monopoly of the patentees.9
Similarly, the Keeler Court found no infringement when a dealer knowingly 
purchased a patented product from a manufacturer licensed to make and sell it only in 
Michigan and then resold it in Massachusetts.
 
10
one who buys patented articles of manufacture from one 
authorized to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property 
in such articles, unrestricted in time or place…. The conclusion 
reached does not deprive a patentee of his just rights, because no 
article can be unfettered from the claim of his monopoly without 
paying its tribute.
 The Court declared that 
11
The principles of these early patent cases and of Bobbs-Merrill were followed when 
the Court dealt with alleged patent infringement by dealers reselling patented products 
at discounted prices. In Bauer a patentee-manufacturer “licensed” dealers to resell only 
 
                                                 
9Id. at 456. 
 
10Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895). 
 
11Id. at 666-667. 
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at specified prices, claiming that resale is a “use” of the patented article that is subject to 
the patentee's control because the patent grants the pantentee “the exclusive right to 
make, use, and vend the invention.”12 Discounted resale prices would then be an 
unlicensed use and thus an infringement. The Court disagreed, holding that “it is a 
perversion of terms to call the transaction in any sense a license to use the invention,”13 
and quoting from Adams the proposition that selling the goods removes them from the 
patent monopoly.14
The Supreme Court found it equally easy to rebuff the more complicated scheme in 
the Straus case.
 
15
that only the right to use the machine “for demonstrating 
purposes” is granted to “distributors” (wholesale dealers), but that 
these “distributors” may assign a like right “to the public” or to 
“regularly licensed Victor dealers” (retailers) “at the dealers' regular 
discount royalty”; that the “dealers” may convey the “license to use 
the machine” only when a “royalty” of not less than $200 shall have 
been paid, and upon the “consideration” that all of the conditions of 
the “license” shall have been observed; that the title to the machine 
shall remain in the plaintiff which shall have the right to repossess it 
 The Court described the “license notice” attached to each patented 
machine as declaring 
                                                 
12Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913). 
 
13Id. at 16. 
 
14Id. at 18. 
 
15Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917). 
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upon breach of any of the conditions of the notice, by paying to the 
user the amount paid by him less five per cent for each year that 
the machine has been used.16
The Court noted that “the full price, called a ‘royalty,’ was paid before the 
[manufacturer] parted with the possession of it,”
 
17 and concluded that this “scheme of 
distribution is not a system designed to secure to the plaintiff and to the public a 
reasonable use of its machines, within the grant of the patent laws, but is in substance 
and in fact a mere price-fixing enterprise.”18 Once again, the patent laws did not make 
price cutting an infringement. In the Ethyl19 and Univis20
The Ethyl Company held a patent on an “anti-knock” fluid that the company made 
and sold to gasoline refiners, who incorporated it in their gas. The resulting mixture was 
also subject to Ethyl's patent. The refiners were restricted from selling to jobbers other 
than those licensed by Ethyl, and jobbers were restricted from selling to gasoline 
stations other than those approved by Ethyl. Although such customer restrictions might 
 cases, patentees had issued 
licenses to wholesalers and retailers, setting the price at which each could sell to the 
next party in the chain. In both instances, the Supreme Court held that patent law did 
not protect the manufacturers and applied Dr. Miles to condemn the arrangement. 
                                                 
16Id. at 494-495. 
 
17Id. at 500. 
 
18Id. at 501. 
 
19Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. 
Janis Mark A. Lemley, and Christopher R. Leslie, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
Applied to Intellectual Property Law §§24.1c, 24.2d(2d ed. 2010). 
 
20United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
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be valid standing alone, the Court deemed them fatally contaminated by Ethyl's unlawful 
purpose: Ethyl withdrew or threatened to withdraw its approval or “licenses” from 
jobbers and retailers selling below certain prices.21 Controlling the jobbers' prices and 
distribution policies was held to fall outside Ethyl's patent, which, the Court declared, 
was “exhausted” no later than upon the refiners' sales of the patented mixture to 
jobbers.22
Similarly, the Univis Company sold unfinished blank lenses to firms that ground and 
completed them before selling them to other dealers or to the public. The finished 
product was subject to Univis's patent. Univis purported to license each intermediary 
who finished the product or otherwise handled it and to fix their resale prices. The Court 
held that 
 
where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it 
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the 
protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished 
by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his 
invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article. 
The reward he has demanded and received is for the article and 
the invention which it embodies and which his vendee is to practice 
upon it. He has thus parted with his right to assert the patent 
monopoly with respect to it and is no longer free to control the price 
at which it may be sold either in its unfinished or finished form. No 
                                                 
21Ethyl Gasoline, 309 U.S. at 452-454. 
22Id. at 457. The Court emphasized that Ethyl's business was selling patented fluid, and not the 
gasoline mixture. 
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one would doubt that if the patentee's licensee had sold the blanks 
to a wholesaler or finishing retailer, without more, the purchaser 
would not infringe by grinding and selling them. The added 
stipulation by the patentee fixing resale prices derives no support 
from the patent and must stand on the same footing under the 
Sherman Act as like stipulations with respect to unpatented 
commodities.23
With the patent put aside, the arrangement violated Dr. Miles' prohibition of resale 
price maintenance.
 
24
The first sale, or patent “exhaustion,” doctrine operates only as a limitation on the 
rights created under the relevant intellectual property statutes; it does not independently 
create or modify antitrust liability. This distinction between removal of the intellectual 
property immunity and the creation of antitrust liability is particularly important in rule of 
reason cases.  To illustrate, suppose that patentee General Electric licensed 
Westinghouse to manufacture light bulbs under GE's patent. The license agreement 
stipulated that (1) Westinghouse could not charge a wholesale price higher than $1.00 
each for the finished bulbs; and (2) resellers who purchased from Westinghouse could 
not sell the bulbs to consumers for a price higher than $1.50. As interpreted in the 
 
                                                 
23Univis, 316 U.S. at 250-251. Note that this language implies that Ethyl had exhausted its patent 
rights when it sold its patented fluid to the refiners; because such fluid had no use except to be combined 
with gasoline, the refiner would have an implied license to make the patented combination, just as those 
who purchase blanks from Univis do not infringe its patent over the finished product by grinding and 
finishing the blanks. 
 
24The Univis Court relied on United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926)  and Ethyl 
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). See Univis, 316 U.S. at 251, 252, 254. 
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General Electric case,1 the Patent Act itself authorizes the first agreement, stipulating 
the wholesale price charged by Westinghouse, and thus immunizes it from antitrust 
liability. However, under the exhaustion limitation, the Patent Act would create no 
immunity for the second agreement, setting the maximum retail price, for this agreement 
applies to a transaction beyond the original sale. Nevertheless, the loss of immunity 
does not itself create antitrust liability. In this case the arrangement in question imposes 
maximum resale prices. Such arrangements are treated under the rule of reason and 
are only rarely unlawful.2
In its 2008 Quanta Computer decision, the Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of the 
patent exhaustion rule (that is, the first sale doctrine) and held that it applies to method 
patents as well.
 
3
 It has always been the case, however, that the IP right holder can enter into at least 
some contracts with either the first or the subsequent purchaser controlling the 
  Under that doctrine, a patentee who has sold a patented articles gives 
up control over it and cannot take advantage of the patent laws to impose further 
restraints on it; as a result, someone who repurchases the article from the initial 
purchaser and who violates such a restriction cannot be guilty of patent infringement. 
                                                 
1 See 272 U.S. 476 . 
 
2 See 8 Antitrust Law ¶1635 (3d ed. 2010) (in press). Before the decision in GTE Sylvania that 
applied the rule of reason to vertical nonprice restraints, they were also illegal per se. During that period 
exhaustion was frequently applied so as to condemn vertical nonprice restraints involving intellectual 
property licenses. E.g., American Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enters., 362 F. Supp. 32, 38-39 
(N.D. Ohio. 1973) (license to manufacturer restricted its sales to an assigned territory and required it to 
impose similar restraints upon its distributors; latter held not enforceable: “territorial restrictions beyond 
the first sale are not sanctioned by 35 U.S.C. §261). Accord Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, 448 F.2d 872, 879-880 
(2d Cir. 1971). Cf. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1207-1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(concluding that even under Sylvania it was unlawful for patentee to impose field-of-use restriction on 
subsequent purchaser). 
 
3 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
 
Hovenkamp  RPM, Agency, IP and First Sale   Dec. 2010, Page 11 
disposition or use of the protected good. The Copyright Act contemplates the first sale 
doctrine, and its legislative history contemplates the use of contracts to get around 
some of its limitations.4
We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta [the 
indirect purchaser] does not necessarily limit LGE's [the patentee's] 
other contract rights. LGE's complaint does not include a breach-of-
contract claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract 
damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to 
eliminate patent damages. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed 
Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (“Whether a patentee may protect 
himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the 
purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we express 
no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise 
as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent 
meaning and effect of the patent laws”).
 In Quanta the Supreme Court refused to decide the issue with 
respect to the Patent Act, stating in a footnote: 
5
 
 
There is no reason to think that Quanta upset the status quo on the contract issue. 
Thus, a patent infringement action to enforce a resale price maintenance restriction 
                                                 
4 17 U.S.C. §109; and see H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5693. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Maryland L. Rev. 616, 663 & nn. 
220–221 (2008) (“although Congress intended to allow parties to contract around the first-sale doctrine, it 
would require that such waivers be enforced through breach of contract actions, not through copyright 
infringement actions.”). 
 
5Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2122 n. 7. 
Hovenkamp  RPM, Agency, IP and First Sale   Dec. 2010, Page 12 
placed on a patented article could not be maintained once the patentee has sold the 
article. However, a contract entered into with the first or presumably any subsequent 
purchaser of a patented article and imposing a resale price would likely be enforceable 
unless it violated antitrust's rule of reason. Of course, all ordinary contract law 
requirements would apply, including privity of contract with the person against whom 
enforcement is sought. And the remedy for breach would be a contract remedy, not a 
cause of action for patent infringement. 
 
